

# Impacts of Extreme Space Weather on GB Electricity Network

Space Weather and Finance Sector Symposium




Andrew Richards  
Severe Risk and Resilience Analyst  
27 April 2015

# National Grid

---

- Own the high voltage network in England and Wales
- Operates the high voltage network in England, Wales and Scotland
- Almost 8000 km of transmission line and cable




# Transmission and Distribution

National Grid  
Reliability  
99.9999%



Generation



Supply

# Space Weather in National Risk Register

Figure 1: Risks of terrorist and other malicious attacks




Figure 2: Other risks




## Key Historic Evidence

- 1859 Carrington Event: Largest known storm
- 1921 New York Railroad Storm: Damaged equipment and fires
- 1940 Easter Sunday Storm: First Power Grid effects
- 1989 Quebec Blackout: First major storm of the Electricity Grid Age, 2 NG transformers damaged
- 2003 Halloween Storm: Malmö, Sweden blackout. Transformers in South Africa damaged

# Risk Factors

- Geographic Location
  - Further north
  - Geological structure – down to 800km
  - Coastal effects
  - Edge of system
- Length of lines
- Higher voltage
- Network topology
- Transformer design
- Backup transformers (redundancy)



National Grid: GIC estimate for one extreme scenario

# Risk Levels of Possible Effects

## from Severe Space Weather Event

---

- Widespread damage/destruction of high voltage transformers
  - Major disruption to electricity network
  - Recovery time of years

Effectively zero chance
- Damage small number of transformers
  - Approx 13 transformers, 6 in E+W, 7 in Scotland
  - High financial impact on NG
  - Little impact on end customers
  - Replacement time: months

1 in 100 years
- Voltage and Harmonic effects
  - Local voltage collapse
  - High financial impact on local areas
  - Recovery time: 12 hours – 2 days

1 in 30 years
- Low level degradation of transformers
  - Increased failure rate

# Potential effects of space weather

---

- ❑ No propagation of GIC into distribution networks
- ❑ Any effects on distribution network
  - ❑ equivalent to power outage from any other cause
- ❑ Worst case scenario
  - ❑ mean of 13 supergrid transformers damaged
  - ❑ Roughly equal split between E+W and Scotland
- ❑ Possible prolonged loss of supply to 2 small substations
- ❑ UK seems more resilient than many systems at equivalent latitude




(Credit: K. Turnbull / J. Wild / ESA)



# Mitigation Timescales

---

- ❑ National Grid requires 4 days to take its mitigating actions
- ❑ Space Weather Forecasting gives
  - ❑ Best case 24 hours notice
  - ❑ Worst case 10 hours notice
- ❑ National Grid has to take action before any actual warning from Space Weather Forecasters




# Build up to event and Warning schedule


---

- Day -5 onward
  - Observation of active sunspot group
    - Monitor all available space weather sources carefully
    - Initiate Silver Command structure
    - Issue Notification of Preparation for Geomagnetic Disturbance
      - Government, DNOs, Generators
    - Assess state of transmission system
      - Take any necessary early actions: recall circuits / halt outages
- Day -1
  - Observe CME
  - Issue Notification of Possible Geomagnetic Disturbance
  - Activate strategic mitigation plans
- T -15 minutes
  - Observe south-oriented Bz at ACE
  - Issue Notification of Expected Geomagnetic Disturbance and warning of system disturbance


# Sunspot Size




X1: 7 Jan 2014




X17: 29 Oct 2003




X17: 9 Sept 2005



X15: 12 Mar 1989



X1: 29 Mar 2001 and X28+ 29 Aug 1859



Many X1 – X3 flares: 18-28 Oct 2014

# Categorisation of Disturbances

| Category   | Frequency                | Description   | Action   |
|------------|--------------------------|---|--|
| Category 1 | 4 or 5 per 11 year cycle | Media Interest. No effects on system  | None   |
| Category 2 | 2 or 3 per 11 year cycle | Minor Disturbance. Small voltage fluctuations seen on system.   | MAGIC deployed. Heightened Awareness. Within NG normal working parameters  |
| Category 3 | 1 per 11 year cycle      | Storm. Voltage disturbances needing to be managed.  | MAGIC deployed. Notice of system disturbance issued. Extra reactive power support. All transformers at high risk substations switched in.  |
| Category 4 | 1 in 30 year event       | Major Storm. Very high reactive power demands. Likelihood of high voltage disturbance. Possibility of Bucholtz alarms on a few high risk transformers           | DECC informed. Silver Command convened. All-in procedure. Circuits returned to service. All transformers connected. Extra generation synchronised. Extra reactive support. Interconnectors set to float. |
| Category 5 | 1 in 100 year event      | Extreme storm. Carrington-like. Very high reactive power demands. Possibility of local voltage collapse. Likelihood of thermal damage to 10 - 20 transformers.. | DECC informed. Silver Command convened. All-in procedure. Circuits returned to service. All transformers connected. Extra generation synchronised. Extra reactive support. Interconnectors set to float. |

# Space Weather Scale Comparisons

---

| Kp Scale   | NOAA G-Scale | National Grid Scale |
|------------|--------------|---------------------|
| Kp 9       | G5           | Category 5          |
|            |              | Category 4          |
|            |              | Category 3          |
|            |              | Category 2          |
| Kp 8 to 9- | G4           | Category 1          |
| Kp 7       | G3           |                     |
| Kp 6       | G2           |                     |
| Kp 5       | G1           |                     |
| Kp < 5     |              |                     |

# Any Questions

---

